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This study develops a theoretical general equilibrium model to examine optimal externality 
tax policy in the presence of externalities linked to one another through markets rather than 
technical production relationships. Analytical results reveal that the second-best externality 
tax rate may be greater or less than the first-best rate, depending largely on the elasticity of 
substitution between the two externality-generating products.  These results are explored 
empirically for the case of greenhouse gas from fossil fuel and nitrogen emissions associated 
with biofuels. 
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OPTIMAL TAXATION OF EXTERNALITIES INTERACTING THROUGH 
MARKETS: A THEORETICAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines optimal externality tax policy in the presence of externalities linked to one 
another through markets rather than technical production relationships.  In lieu of correlations 
between externalities arising through a single production process, we are interested in interaction 
that arises from market relationships between multiple processes embedded within the economy.  
We refer to these as “interacting externalities.” Our analysis elaborates on the theory of the 
second best (Lipsey  and  Lancaster  1956).  That theory  states that if one of the Paretian 
conditions cannot be fulfilled, an optimal solution is likely to require departures from other 
Paretian conditions. As a corollary, if multiple market failures exist in the economy, eliminating 
one doesn’t necessarily improve welfare. As described in Bennear and Stavins (2007), multiple 
market failures can be jointly ameliorating (correction of one market failure ameliorates welfare 
loss from the other), jointly reinforcing (correction of one market failure exacerbates welfare loss 
from the other), or neutral (correction of one market failure doesn’t affect welfare loss from the 
other). With multiple market failures, the interrelationships can become  complex, requiring 
explicit numerical examination to penetrate the web.   
 
The theory of second best has received extensive study in the analytical environmental policy 
literature.  Many  studies examine interactions between an environmental externality and pre-
existing distortions from labor or capital taxes (e.g.,  Bovenberg and Goulder  1996, 1997; 
Fullerton and Metcalf 2001; Oates and Schwab 1988; and Parry 1995, 1997). With varying 
assumptions about policy instruments and revenue recycling measures, their results differ 
substantially. For example, a second-best tax on the externality can be either higher or lower than 
the first-best Pigouvian tax. The optimal environmental tax is a function of multiple terms: (1) a 
Ramsey term, which represents the revenue-raising function, and (2) the Pigouvian components 
that relate to each externality (e.g, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1994; and Sandmo 1975).  
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Very few studies consider corrective taxes in the presence of multiple simultaneous externalities. 
Caplan and Silva (2005) introduce the concept of “correlated externalities” to define multiple 
pollutants jointly  produced by a single source that  cause  differentiated regional and global 
externalities. Within a multi-stage game theory framework, they find  that  non-cooperative, 
command-and-control  environmental policies fail to achieve first-best optimality, but a joint 
permits mechanism can achieve a Pareto optimum.  However, different externalities are usually 
regulated separately,  or  a  single source of multiple externalities is regulated using a single 
instrument because a joint mechanism could face many political obstacles, especially for a global 
externality. For example, Peterson (1999) evaluates optimal agricultural land pricing policies 
considering pollution from agricultural land as well as non-market environmental benefits such 
as open space. Thus, one source, land, generates both a public good and a public bad. He finds 
the optimal land subsidy to correct the public goods is not equal the net extra-market regional 
values of the land amenities. Parry and Small (2005) evaluate the optimal gasoline tax 
considering externalities from traffic accidents, congestion, and air pollution.  In a similar spirit, 
Khanna et al. (2008) develop a stylized economic model to evaluate the first-best and second-
best ethanol policies in the presence of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and traffic congestion 
resulting from transportation uses of fuel. In each of these studies, a simple price-based policy 
instrument is applied to a single product to correct its multiple externalities.    
 
This paper departs from the previous literature by developing a theoretical general equilibrium 
model incorporating two environmental externalities resulting from different industries  that 
interact through market demands, in an economy with no government revenue requirement. The 
levels of the two externalities are determined not only by their individual production 
technologies, but also by the interaction between their sources in the market. In the model, two 
taxes are available to control the two environmental externalities, and the resulting revenues are 
transferred to consumers in lump-sum. Ideally, the tax rates for the two externalities are each set 
at its first-best level. However, if one of the externalities cannot be corrected fully, i.e., one tax is 
constrained below  the marginal environmental damage of the corresponding externality,  the 
optimal tax rate for the other externality is unclear. Our results indicate that the optimal second-
best policy depends on the nature of the market relationships between the two goods whose 
production causes the externalities.  By explicitly modeling the production and market 3 
 
interaction of the two sources, this paper evaluates: (1) the effects of a small change in one tax, 
whether or not the tax rates are optimal, and (2) the optimal tax for one externality given a 
distortion from the other externality.  
 
In an effort to illustrate this problem, our analysis is developed in the context of biofuel and 
fossil fuel production and the associated environmental externalities of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
and nitrogen leaching. The biofuel industry has been developed rapidly in many countries, for its 
potential in greenhouse gas reductions and reduced dependence on foreign oil. Currently, the 
leading biofuel is ethanol. In 2009, the world’s top ethanol producers were the United States 
(10.79 billion gallons) and Brazil (6.58 billion gallons), which account for about 89% of the 
world production (Renewable Fuel Association, 2010). As the most successful ethanol producer 
in the world, Brazil met 17.6% of its transportation energy requirements with ethanol in 2008, in 
term of energy balance (Empresa de Pesquisa Energética, 2009). As for the US, ethanol accounts 
for about 8% of the gasoline market by volume (ERS/USDA, 2010), but growing fast. Both 
fossil fuel and biofuel production processes emit GHGs, but in different amounts per unit of 
output. The biofuel production process emits less carbon, but U.S. corn-based ethanol production 
discharges nitrogen into the water environment.
1
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FertilizerUse/
 Nitrogen  in water can cause respiratory 
problems in infants and exacerbate algae growth and hypoxia in waterbodies. For the United 
States, the most severe problem associated with excessive nutrients is hypoxia in the Gulf of 
Mexico. A report released by National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (Rabalais et al. 
1999) concluded that excess nitrogen from the Mississippi River combined with stratification of 
the Gulf’s water is the cause of the hypoxia. Added production of nitrogen-intensive feedstocks, 
especially corn, to support increasing use of biofuel would add to the problem. Although the 
nitrogen discharge issue with sugarcane in Brazil is not as bad as with  corn, the nitrogen 
application rate for sugarcane is still 80-100 kg/ha/year (Martinelli and Filoso, 2008), comparing 
to over 150 kg/ha/year for corn production in USA  (ERS/USDA,  
).  With  a  60-80%  leaching  rate, the expansion of 
sugarcane ethanol production is responsible for eutrophication of dams and reservoirs in Brazil 
                                                 
1 In addition to increasing soluble forms of nitrogen into surface water, fertilizer used in crop production generates 
N2O which is a GHG. Policies designed to reduce nitrogen would affect N2O emissions as well as nitrogen runoff. In 
this paper, the N2O emissions are omitted to simplify the analysis. Further study with a more complex model would 
be required to analyze the effects of a nitrogen policy on total GHG emissions.  4 
 
(Martinelli and Filoso, 2008). Given the global expansion of the ethanol market, the nitrogen 
leaching issue cannot be ignored.  
 
So the two environmental externalities, carbon emissions and nitrogen leaching, are associated 
with two different products, and the two products are substitutes in the market. The interaction 
between the two pollutants acts through the relative demands for the two products. A first best 
tax for nitrogen leaching is unlikely because nitrogen leaching is a non-point source pollutant, 
and its accurate measurement is infeasible. Instead, this externality might be partially corrected 
by a fertilizer tax, or command-and-control policies applied to fertilizer management. Given a 
suboptimal policy for nitrogen discharges, the optimal tax for GHG may  depend on how it 
affects nitrogen releases, which is mediated by the relationships between biofuel and fossil fuel.  
Following the theoretical analysis, we examine these relationships numerically to quantify the 
second-best GHG tax in the face of inability to apply the first-best tax on nitrogen. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section 3 describes the 
method used to solve the system. Section 4 develops the analytical solutions for a small increase 
of GHG tax and characterizes the optimal GHG tax. Section 5 offers a numerical example to 
illustrate the nature of the interactions between policies,  and  it  uses sensitivity analysis to 
determine effects of the most important parameters. Section 6 draws conclusions.  
 
2. Model Structure 
We continue the fossil fuel/biofuel metaphor in developing our analytical model. Consider an 
economy with n identical individuals who own one resource, a composite factor L (which can be 
a composite of labor, land and capital). The individuals receive utility from consumption of two 
goods: a composite commodity X and energy E. Energy E is consumers’ energy demand, and it 
can be met by consuming fossil fuel F, biofuel B, or both. The final demand ratio of biofuel to 
fossil fuel can be viewed as the blend percentage of biofuel in liquid fuel. We assume this ratio 
can be any value between zero and one. In this model,   could be viewed as (1) a 
sub-utility function, (2) a home production function representing the consumer’s production of 
energy, or (3) a firm’s production function used to produce E for purchase by households. For 
concreteness, we take the last approach. All the uppercase letters refer to per-capita amounts.  5 
 
 
Production of X is assumed to require the composite factor (in amount LX) and energy (amount 
EX). Fossil fuel F is produced using   as an input.
2
        
  Biofuel B is produced using an amount of 
the composite factor LB. However, during the production and consumption processes, both fossil 
fuel and biofuel generate pollutants. Fossil fuel is a “dirty” product with pollutant emission C, 
representing CO2 emissions. Biofuel is a substitute for fossil fuel. Combustion of biofuel also 
emits C, but the life cycle emissions from biofuel are less than those from fossil fuel. The 
emissions from fossil fuel are therefore measured by the net emission compared to biofuel. At 
the same time, production of biofuel induces nitrogen leaching, N. In this paper, the pollutant is 
treated as an input in the production process. The difference between inputs for F and B allows 
us to focus not only on the environmental effects but also on the different input requirements. 
With the assumptions  of perfect  competition and constant returns to scale, the production 
functions are assumed to be 
                         (1) 
    (2) 
    (3) 
    (4) 
All production functions are twice continuously differentiable and quasi-concave.  The total 
emissions for each pollutant are summations across n  identical individuals.  Each consumer 
obtains utility from consumption of the composite commodity   (amount  )  and  direct 
consumption of energy, EU, and is affected by total emissions nC and nN:  
    (5) 
with   and  . Utility is twice continuously differentiable and homothetic. 
 
In this static model, the overall factor constraint is: 
    (6) 
where   is the total fixed endowment of the composite factor in the economy. 
 
                                                 
2 It may seem odd to say that fossil fuel is “produced” using another produced composite commodity X, but the 
resulting model is equivalent to one where some of the domestic production of X is exported to another country in 
exchange for import of oil, at a fixed world price. Since X is chosen as numeraire, and the price of the imported oil is 
fixed relative to the price of X, the price of oil is equivalent to the price of X.  6 
 
For the system, the market clearing conditions are 
    (7) 
    (8) 
By the choice of XU and EU, each individual maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint 
    (9) 
where T is the lump-sum transfer to the consumer from the government (where the amount will 
be   ). The unit tax rates for GHG and nitrogen are represented by   and  , 
respectively. Market prices for the composite factor of production L and energy E are defined as 
 and  PE, respectively. The RHS of equation (9) is not chosen by the consumer, but it is 
endogenous to the economy. In this system, X is defined as numeraire. All the quantities and 
prices are endogenously determined except the tax rates for environmental externalities,   and 
, which are exogenous.   
 
3. Solution Strategy 
The system is solved by totally differentiating relevant equations  and solving the resulting 
system of linear differential equations.
3
 
 First, totally differentiating the production functions and 
imposing perfect competition conditions, we have  
  (10) 
    (11) 
    (12) 
    (13) 
where a hat (
︿) denotes a proportional change, e.g., . Parameter   refers to the 
expenditure share for  input   in the total production costs of  , mathematically defined as 
.  Other   parameters are defined analogously. The detailed definition of each 
parameter is listed in Table 1.   
 
Totally differentiating the factor constraint yields 
    (14) 
                                                 
3 With this method, assumptions about specific functional forms for production and utility functions are not required.  
They just need to be continuous and differentiable. The procedure allows us to get analytical closed form solutions 
for the linearized model. However it uses derivatives and is therefore valid only for small changes.  7 
 
where   is the share of   that is used in the production of X, defined as  , with 
.  
 
The market clearing conditions in differentiated forms are: 
    (15) 
    (16) 
where   is the quantity of E used in the production of X relative to the total quantity of E in 
the market, defined as  . All of the   parameters refer to quantity shares and are 
defined analogously.  
 
With perfect competition and constant return to scale, the zero profit conditions for the four 
production sectors can be written as  
   
   
   
   
Rearranging and totally differentiating these conditions yields  
    (17) 
    (18) 
    (19) 
    (20) 
 
Producers of   can substitute between the factor input and energy, depending on the prices they 
face,   and  , according to  , the elasticity of substitution in the production technology.
4 
The producer’s response to changes in prices can be obtained from the definition of  : 
   
                                                 
4 This parameter is a measure of curvature or substitutability at the initial equilibrium, for small changes in prices. 
The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functional form is not required except for large changes in prices that 
might be considered using a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model.  8 
 
With no taxes on factor L or energy generally, converting the above equation to the hat form 
yields:  
    (21) 
Pollutant emissions are treated as necessary inputs in the production process. For fossil fuel 
production and use, both X and GHG are required. The elasticity of substitution between the two 
inputs in fossil fuel production is denoted  . The definition of   in hat form analogous to 
equation (21), is written as 
    (22) 
where the tax   is the only price for input C. 
 
For biofuel feedstock production, nitrogen leaching might be reduced through improved fertilizer 
management strategies, genetic engineering that increases the nutrient conversion efficiency of 
crops, or substitution of cellulosic feedstocks for nutrient-intensive grains. We expect 
substitutability between nitrogen leaching and capital (part of the composite input L). Several 
studies have estimated a nonzero elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and other inputs in 
corn productions, a major biofuel feedstock in the United States (e.g., Hertel et al. 1996; and 
Thompson  et al.  2006).  From the definition of the elasticity of substitution (analogous to 
equations (21) and (22)), we have 
  .  (23) 
Energy, in this paper, is yielded by a production process with inputs of fossil fuel and biofuel. 
We assume fossil fuel and biofuel are imperfect substitutes with elasticity of substitution  , due 
to the different energy contents, the need for vehicle modifications when the ratio of biofuel 
(ethanol) to fossil fuel (gasoline) exceeds a certain level, and environmental considerations. 
Analogous to equations (21), (22) and (23), we have  
    (24) 
     
From the definition of the elasticity of substitution in utility, the relationship between 
consumption changes for   and   is: 
    (25) 9 
 
By construction,  , so an increase in energy price index   will lead to more relative 
consumption of   (i.e., more   relative to  ).  
 
Totally differentiating the budget constraint yields: 
     
     
Combining the above two equations, we get  
    (26) 
Similar to previous definitions,   refers to the expenditure share for   in the consumer’s total 
income, defined as  , and   is defined analogously. The mathematical definitions 
for  ,  , and   are similar to   with different economic definitions. They refer to the 
income shares, rather than the expenditure shares. For example,   is the share of income from 
rebate of a GHG tax in total income.  
 
The numeraire is X. Thus   and  . In this system, we have 16 variables ( ,  ,  , 
,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and  ) 17 equations (equations (10) to (26)). 
Based on Walras’ law, if all markets but one are in equilibrium, the last market must also be in 
equilibrium. Thus one of the market clearing conditions can be dropped. In this study, the market 
clearing condition for energy is dropped, i.e., equation (15). This leaves us with 16 variables and 
16 equations. Now we can solve the system for the changes of prices and quantities with 
corresponding changes of   or  . Since C and N are modeled symmetrically in the system, the 
results are similar for the two cases with ( ,  ) and ( ,  ). Thus only the 
GHG tax case ( ,  ) is explored here. Corresponding results for a change in the 
nitrogen tax ( ,  ) are provided in Appendix A. 
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4. Policy Implication 
4.1 Effects of GHG Tax 
We start the analysis by introducing a small exogenous increase of the GHG tax,  , while 
keeping the nitrogen tax constant ( ).  
 
Solving the system of equations in previous section, the changes in the prices and quantities of 
interest, induced by the change in the carbon tax rate, are: 
                                                                                                                          (27) 
                                                                                                     (28) 
                                                                                                               (29) 
   (30) 
  
(31) 
   
(32) 
            (33) 













All of the parameters,  s β  and  s θ , are positive and less than one. Thus D1, D2, A2, A4, A5, and A6 
are clearly positive. The signs for A1 and A3 are also positive, as shown in Appendix B. Thus, we 
can determine the signs of some effects on equilibrium quantities and prices, as summarized in 
Table 2.  
 
First look at the last three rows of Table 2. Our model implies that the price change for each 
commodity is jointly determined by the price change of each of its inputs and the corresponding 
expenditure share of that input. For example, as shown in Equation (27), the percentage change 
of   is simply determined by the expenditure share of C in production of F,  , times the price 
change of C,   (since the other input, X, is numeraire). A positive   unambiguously increases 
, since a positive   directly increases the production cost of F. Other prices are determined in 
the same manner, except the mathematical expressions are more complex because of the indirect 
effects of   on their inputs.  
   
Equation (28) shows the solution of  . Since its denominator and nominator are both positive, 
 is negative. Intuitively, we might expect an increase in the fossil fuel price to induce higher 
biofuel demand and thus a higher biofuel price. However, the demand for biofuel also depends 
on the change in total energy demand, for which the sign is ambiguous. We can explain the 
lower biofuel price due to a higher   from the standpoint of input costs. Energy, whose price 
increases, is an input for X, the numeraire. Thus the price of L, the other input for X, has to fall 
for the producer of X to break even. Yet B is produced using L and N. An increase in   reduces 
the relative price of L but has no effect on the price of nitrogen, since the nitrogen tax rate is 
exogenous. Thus, the final price of biofuel has to decline for the producer of B to break even.  
 
The price of energy depends on the prices of both fossil fuel and biofuel, which change in 
opposite directions. The solution in equation (29) and the last row of Table 2 indicates that   is 
positive. Generally, in the current U.S. market, we might expect   to have the same sign as   
because fossil fuel has a much larger market share than biofuel. Without any assumption about 
the relative values of   and  ,  however,  our result still indicates a positive   for an 
increase of  . The intuition is that the negative change in   is a “feedback effect” to the 
increase of  , where the increase of   is induced directly by the higher  . Due to market 12 
 
adjustments, we expect that the “feedback effect” on   is smaller than the direct effect on  , 
so   is positive even though   is negative.  
 
The quantity changes in equations  (30)  to  (34)  are much more complicated and difficult to 
interpret. However, we can get some insights if we separate the expressions based on elasticities. 
For a change in  , the sign for the coefficient on each elasticity is listed in a column in Table 2. 
As expected, a positive   always  yields a negative   and  . The coefficients on  all of the 
elasticities for the solutions of these two variables are negative, as shown in the second and third 
rows in Table 2. Since we assume F and B are substitutes ( ), we expect an increase in   
to raise the demand for biofuel and the corresponding emissions, N. As shown in the fourth and 
fifth rows in Table 2, however, only the coefficient on   is positive, and all the rest are negative. 
Thus, without additional assumptions, the effects of   on B and N are ambiguous.  
 
An increase in   increases the energy price, which causes the producer of   to substitute factor 
 for energy based on their relative prices and the value of  . This substitution directly reduces 
total energy demand and thus the equilibrium quantities of   and its associated externality C, and 
 and its associated externality N. Thus the first term in each equation (30) to (34) is negative, as 
shown in the first column of Table 2. The same logic applies to  , except that consumers 
substitute   for energy. Thus, with   positive,   also has negative effects on  , C,  , N and  , 
as shown in the second column of Table 2. 
 
The elasticity of substitution between F and B,  , governs the final “blending ratio” of biofuel 
to fossil fuel in the market. With an increase in  ,   rises and   falls. This change in relative 
prices shifts the demand toward B and away from F. Thus, if   increases, then a positive   
implies a negative   and a positive  . Its effect on total energy demand E is ambiguous and 
depends on the market share parameter   (indicating F as a share of E).  
  
The fossil fuel industry (F) can reduce GHG emissions via substitution into the other input  , 
as captured by  . Increasing   directly increases the price of C. As a result, the producer 
reduces  emissions of C  (treated as an input in the production process). On the other hand, 13 
 
because   falls, the elasticity of substitution between   and N in the biofuel production process, 
, implies a negative effect on N. The producer of B accordingly shifts from N to L.  
 
With the elasticities that have definitive signs, an increase in   reduces production of F and 
emissions of C. For the rest of the variables, including B and N, the changes are ambiguous. 
However, with assumptions about the parameter values, we find some definitive results under 
special cases. Before proceeding with special cases, the second-best optimal GHG tax rate ( ) is 
defined.  
 
4.2 Optimal GHG Tax 
To find the optimal GHG tax rate given a preexisting nitrogen tax, the following Langrangian 
equation can to be maximized by the choice of  : 
    (35) 
where  . Given  , fixed  , and exogenous prices for the consumer, 
the total derivative of equation (35) with respect to   is written as  
   
where   is “marginal environmental damage”,  and the subscript refers to the pollutant. For 
example,   is the dollar value of disutility for all consumers from a marginal increase of GHG 
emissions, defined as  , where   is the marginal utility of income. As defined before,  
  and  , so both   and   are positive. 
 
The change in consumer utility includes the changes in damages from the environmental 
externalities (the first two terms on the RHS) and the offsetting environmental tax revenues (the 
last two terms). The optimal GHG tax rate is achieved when  :   
    (36) 
If the nitrogen tax rate,  , is set equal to  , then   equals the marginal damage of GHG,  , 
which is the first-best combination of policies. More realistically, however,  , so the 
second-best   is not equal to   (the marginal damages).  The restriction on   precipitates the 
second-best policy problem.  14 
 
 
To obtain the relationship between the second-best and the first-best tax rate, rewrite equation 
(36) to hat form as: 
    (37) 
where N and C are the benchmark emission levels. Since  ,  ,  , and   all refer to the initial 
levels, and   is exogenously defined,   thus only depends on the ratio between percentage 
changes in nitrogen runoff and GHG emissions. If   is too low ( ) and the increased 
carbon tax reduces C while raising N, then equation (37) indicates that the second-best   is 
below marginal environmental damage of carbon,  . As discussed before, however, the sign of 
 is ambiguous. To get some definitive results, we explore some special cases. 
 
4.3 Policy Implications with Special Cases 
Case 1: As  , then  .  
When the blend ratio is unconstrained,  such as  with  greater market penetration  of flex-fuel 
vehicles, we have practically perfect substitution between fossil fuel, F, and biofuel, B. With 
almost perfect substitution,   is almost infinite. In each of the expressions, equations (30) to 
(34), compared to the term with  , the terms with  ,  ,  , and   are numerically very 
small and accordingly inconsequential to the solution. Then an increase in  , while keeping   
fixed, definitely reduces F and C, while raising B and N. With this case, the two externalities are 
jointly reinforcing, i.e., correction of one market failure exacerbates welfare loss from the other. 
Then   can be written as  
     
Along with the assumption that  , since   and  ,   is less than  , 
the marginal environmental damage from GHG. In this case, a larger distortion in the nitrogen 
market implies a smaller second-best  .  
 
Case 2:  , then    
A very small value of   represents the case with very low substitutability between fossil fuel 
and biofuel, such as when the mix ratio of ethanol reaches the “blend wall”, and the consumer 15 
 
faces a very high cost to switch to alternative vehicles. Then the positive effects of   in the 
corresponding production or emissions are negligible compared to the negative impacts from 
other elasticities of substitutions. The solutions become: 
  (38) 
  (39) 
     (40) 
  (41) 
  (42) 
Equations (38) to (40) indicate that  . With no or very low substitution between F and 
B, a reduction in the production of F due to an increase in   also reduce B at the same rate 
because of the fixed “blending ratio” (the technology to produce E). Thus an increase in   
reduces not only C but also N. Then the two externalities are jointly ameliorating, i.e., correction 
of one market failure ameliorates welfare loss from the other. In this case, since both   and 
, the second term on the RHS in equation (37)  is positive, so   is  higher than the 
marginal environmental damage of GHG emissions. A larger distortion is in the nitrogen market 
implies a larger  .  
 
Case 3:   and   
In general, substitution between gasoline and ethanol is neither perfect nor zero,  since the 
consumers have at least some access to flex fuel vehicles that significantly relax the “blend wall”. 
Whether the value of   is large or small corresponds to consumers’ willingness to switch to the 
flex fuel vehicles. With a generalized  , one special case is when all other production and 
utility functions have the same elasticity value, i.e.,  . Then the 






Under this special case, while keeping   fixed, a positive   reduces F and C (in the first two 
equations, both terms have the same sign). Its effects on B and N depend on the relative sizes of 
 and  .  In the next two equations, the two terms have opposite signs. If 
, the positive effects of   on nitrogen leaching  with an increased   
overcome the negative effects of  ,  ,  , and  , so an increase in   increases nitrogen 
leaching. Then  , like Case 1. On the other hand, if  , an increase 
in   reduces nitrogen leaching, so  , like Case 2.  And, with a knife-edge situation 
where  , then  . 
 
The above three cases cover only a fraction of the possibilities. In general, the knife-edge value 
of   that defines whether   is higher or lower than   is in a much more complex expression 
and depends on the coefficients and the values of all of the elasticities. In the following section, 
plausible values are applied to the parameters to explore the likely size of the effects of a small 
change in   on the economic equilibrium and the optimal value of  . 
 
5. Numerical Analysis 
 5.1 Parameter Impacts 
The numerical analysis is based on US data for 2004. At that time, the major biofuel was corn 
ethanol, so we use data for gasoline and corn ethanol in this analysis. Our model is represented in 
the share forms, including the expenditure shares in production and consumption and the 
quantity shares in total demand. These values are calculated from a Social Accounting Matrix 




Production data for the numeraire X, petrofuel F, and the factor costs for gasoline production are 
directly from GTAP 7.0 (Narayanan and Walmsley 2008). The numeraire   is the combination 
of all commodities produced apart from gasoline-related products.  Factor inputs for ethanol 
production are from the GTAP_BIO developed by Taheripour et al. (2007). The environmental 
inputs (both GHG emissions and nitrogen leaching) for gasoline and corn ethanol are from a 
recent life cycle analysis (Khanna et al. 2009), which concludes that corn ethanol could reduce 
GHG emissions by 30% compared to gasoline. The benchmark GHG tax of $24.9/tonne of CO2 
equivalent is based on available carbon trading prices in European and East Asian markets (the 
World Bank 2005)
5 and then transformed into a 2004 value. No nitrogen externality market or 
tax exists in the United States. Based on a 2002 case study in the Long Island Sound Watershed 




With these major data and related conversion factors, the required parameters can be calculated 
and are shown in Table 1. 
The elasticity values are the most difficult to assign. Many studies have estimated elasticity of 
substitution values between different commodities or inputs in production processes. However, 
due to the extensive aggregation of sectors in our model, suitable elasticity values are not readily 
available in the literature. Instead of making assumptions about those values, the coefficients for 
these parameters in the model solutions are calculated and, based on those coefficients, the most 
important and sensitive elasticity values are determined. With the benchmark values documented 
in Table 1, the coefficients for the elasticities for each variable are listed in Table 3. For a shock 
in  , each cell shows the coefficient for each elasticity (indicated by each column) in the 
solution for each variable (indicated by each row). A higher absolute value of the coefficient 
means a higher impact of this elasticity on that variable.   
 
In Table 3, among all the coefficients for   shown in the second row, the coefficient of   
(column 5) is -0.9350, which departs from zero the most. This indicates that   has the biggest 
impact on C, because   directly increases the GHG price, and   allows the producer of F to 
                                                 
5 The United State has no federal level GHG tax. Although a gasoline tax could correct the GHG externality, the tax 
burden on GHG emissions from the US gasoline tax is less than the value used in this numerical example.  
6 This nitrogen tax applies directly to the nitrogen leaching. It could be a burden to farmers, but it might be an 
effective way to control the hypoxia problem. 18 
 
shift away from C. In the next two rows, the changes in biofuel production,  , and nitrogen 
leaching,  , are affected the most by  . As   rises, PF rises correspondingly. The price change 
for fossil fuel causes a demand shift between F and B, which is governed by  . With the shock 
of  , all the effects of other eleasticites on   and   are relatively indirect compared to the 
effect from  . In terms of the change in total consumption of energy,  ,   has the biggest 
impact among all elasticity values, although none of them are very big. Among all the elasticity 
values,  , the elasticity of substitution between factor L and N, has the lowest impact on all the 
variables of concern, because   affects the price of L only remotely and has no impact on the 
nitrogen price.      
 
 5.2 Policy Impact 
In this section, we first discuss plausible elasticity values. Based on those values, we calculate 
the impacts of a change in   on  all of the variables and compute   under the preexisting 
distortion in the nitrogen market.  
 
In the production of biofuel,   defines the elasticity of substitution between factor L  and 
nitrogen leaching. No existing literature documents the substitutability between nitrogen runoff 
and other factors. However, nitrogen runoff is directly related to fertilizer usage in feedstock 
production. Thompson et al. (2006) estimate that the elasticity of substitution between fertilizer 
and other factors is nearly unity in U.S. corn production. Yasar and Uzunoz (2006) estimate the 
elasticity of substitution between fertilizer and other inputs is between 0.74 and 0.86 in sugar 
beet production in Turkey. In our model, ethanol producers can switch feedstocks, so we expect 
an even higher elasticity of substitution between the two inputs. As indicated in Table 3, the 
effects of   on the system solutions are fairly low, so the result is not sensitive to this value. 
Thus, in this example, the Cobb-Douglas functional form is assumed for biofuel production, i.e., 
.  
 
The elasticity of substitution between GHG and X in the production of fossil fuel,  , can be 
fairly low. Most studies generally assume that GHG emissions are proportional to fossil fuel 
consumption. However, as more fuel-efficient technology/vehicles and carbon abatement 
technologies are developed, the substitution between X and GHG emissions becomes easier, and 19 
 
we expect a positive value of   in this study. Since   has the biggest impact on GHG 
emissions, the value of   is very important. A small positive value of   = 0.1 is assumed in the 
numerical example, and then sensitivity analysis is conducted on this value.  
 
The value for the elasticity of substitution between energy and factor L in the production process 
for X,  , is adopted from the value between capital and energy in the capital-energy composite 
in the GTAP_E model (Burniaux and Truong 2002). For elasticities of substitution between 
fossil fuel and biofuel, few studies have estimated   due to inadequate data. In a modified 
GTAP_E model application by Birur  et al. (2008),  the elasticity of substitution between 
petroleum energy and biofuel for the US is defined as 3.75. With this value, they are able to 
reproduce biofuel production in accordance with the historical evidence between 2001 and 2006 
with reasonable precision. We use their value in our model.  
 
Concerning the elasticity of substitution between X and energy for the consumer,  , generally, 
transportation energy demand is fairly inelastic. Two meta-analyses (Espey 1996; and Goodwin 
et al. 2004) find that the average price-elasticity of demand for gasoline is around -0.25 in the 
short run. Based on the consumption ratio of energy, the elasticity of substitution between energy 
and other commodities is less than 0.2. A more recent study estimates the price elasticities of 
gasoline demand for two periods of time, ranging from -0.034 to -0.077 during 2001 to 2006, 
versus  -0.21 to -0.34 for 1975 to 1980 (Hughes, et al. 2007). It concludes that demand for 
gasoline has become less elastic over time. We use a value of 0.2 for  . Although the 
coefficients of   for all the variables shown in Table 3 are not so small that they can be ignored, 
given the fact that the expected value of   is generally fairly low, the effects of   on the 
variables of concern will be relatively small. Thus even though the value of   is uncertain, 
sensitivity analysis is not essential. The elasticity values in the numerical example are 
summarized in Table 1. 
 
With the assigned parameter values, the effects of a small change (1% increase) in   are listed 
in Table 4. As expected, an  increase in   reduces  F,  C, and E.  It  increases  B  and  N. The 
percentage increase in N is about two times the percentage reduction in C.  
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To evaluate the optimal GHG tax,  , we need the marginal damage of both GHG emissions and 
nitrogen leaching. Both are very difficult to estimate. In this paper, only a specific value of   is 
assumed. The optimal GHG tax is then presented as a function of the marginal damage from 
GHG emissions,  , showing how much the second-best policy differs from the first-best.  
 
In a survey of environmental  damage estimates,  Smith (1992)  suggests  that the economic 
damages of nitrogen leaching  to the water system probably lie within  a range of 0.27% to 
18.24% of total crop value. Abrahams and Shortle (2004) use 10% of total crop value in their 
study, which is about the mid-point of the range reported by Smith. In our model, the crop sector 
is not explicitly modeled. With the GTAP data, the assumption that the environmental damage of 
nitrogen runoff is about 10% of total crop value implies that   is approximately $5.70/lb. 
Accordingly, the optimal GHG tax ($/ton) is: 
 
This result indicates that the optimal GHG tax is  $12/ton equivalent of CO2  less than the 
marginal damage of GHG emissions, given our benchmark values. If the nitrogen tax is less than 
the assumed value of $1.73/lb, or if   is higher than $5.70/lb, then the optimal GHG tax,  , is 
even further below the marginal damage of GHG emissions.  
 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
As  shown in Table 3, the values of   and   are fairly important to the changes of 
environmental emissions, which are our major concerns. In this section, ranges of values for 
these two parameters are tested to see the sensitivity of our results to these two parameters.  
 
Ethanol and gasoline are highly substitutable commodities, and we expect an elasticity of 
substitution greater than unity. In the numerical example, the value for   is set to 3.75, as in 
Birur et al. (2008). In the sensitivity analysis, the alternative values tested range from 0 to 5, to 
represent all possible cases discussed earlier. The upper value represents nearly perfect 
substitution. For  , most studies generally assume the GHG emissions are proportional to fossil 
energy consumption. However, with new technology for carbon abatement, the possibility of a 21 
 
positive   cannot be neglected. Since we expect a relatively low substitution level, we test a 
range of   from 0 to 0.5. Table 5a shows the percentage change of production levels with a 1% 
increase of  , for different values of  , and Table 5b shows the optimal GHG tax. Table 6 
documents the corresponding results with different  .   
 
Although other variables are not sensitive to the different values of   as shown in Table 5a, 
GHG emissions respond significantly to it. Table 5b indicates that   is also very sensitive to the 
value of  , especially when   is relatively low. Compare the values in the column for   
and the next column ( , in both Table 5a and Table 5b. If   is 0, a 1% increase of   
reduces GHG emissions by only 0.03%, and   is $55/ton lower than the marginal damages of 
GHG emissions ( ). However, if   is raised only from zero to 0.1, then a 1% 
increase of   reduces GHG emission by 0.12%, and   is $12/ton lower than marginal damages 
( ). Higher values of   mean more reduction of GHG emissions from an increase 
in  , and   is closer to marginal damage. In another words, if the chosen value of   is less 
than the true value, the effects of   on GHG emissions are underestimated, and the calculated 
 is less than optimal. The major concern regarding   is that if   is low, the optimal GHG tax 
is very sensitive to its value. A difference of 0.1 in the value of  , from its baseline of 0.1, 
could result in more than a $40/ton swing in the optimal GHG tax. 
 
Concerning  , none of the variables are as sensitive to   as were GHG emissions to the size of 
. However, almost all outcomes are responsive to   to some extent. Among all the outcome 
values, B and N are the two most sensitive to the values of  ; their signs change from negative 
to positive as   increases (see Table 6a). With a small  , i.e., low substitution between F and 
B, a positive change in   decreases B and N, as well as F and C. Correspondingly, the optimal 
 is greater than the first best tax. With a greater  , an increase in   increases B and N. With a 
greater value of  , a specific change in   yields more nitrogen leaching. If F and B are close 
substitutes, optimal   is smaller than the first best tax. A higher   results in a lower  , but the 
effect is limited. If the estimated value of   is lower than the true value, nitrogen leaching is 
underestimated and the calculated   is higher than the optimal value.   
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6. Caveats for This Analysis 
This paper uses a general equilibrium model to address an important policy issue. All standard 
assumptions for general equilibrium analysis are applied: all markets are assumed to be perfectly 
competitive, production is assumed to be constant return to scale, all markets clear, factors are 
mobile, and all agents are well informed. We look at two externalities only, while abstracting 
from other market imperfections.  These assumptions provide reasonable simplifications  to 
enable study of  the questions of  interest. For this  particular  application,  we employ  a 
linearization procedure to solve our general equilibrium system. This method allows us to solve 
for analytical closed form solutions without making assumptions for specific functional forms, 
but it restricts our analysis to small changes around the assumed preexisting equilibrium.    
 
As a stylized general equilibrium analysis, this paper highly aggregates the other commodity 
sectors while focusing on fossil fuel and biofuel markets. Many issues are left out, such as trade, 
imperfect markets, increasing returns to scale, inflexible prices, unemployment,  other 
government regulations and other externalities. Any of these strong assumptions could be 
relaxed, with additional complications that might detract from the simple intuition provided here. 
For example, energy markets are often regulated rather than perfectly competitive. While any of 
those additional complications might add effects not studied here, they would not remove the 
effects we do study here. In particular, a carbon tax may reduce the GHG externality, but induce 
substitution into biofuels that cause a different externality.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to address policy issues surrounding a special 
case of multiple externalities. Unlike previous studies, we incorporate  two environmental 
externalities generated by different sources that also produce substitute goods. Two taxes are 
available to control the two externalities. Since the two externalites are connected through the 
fact that their sources are substitutes in the market, the two taxes interact. Emissions of both 
externalities are jointly determined by the two taxes.  The direction of the effects of one tax on 
the other externality is analytically ambiguous.   
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Using this model, we examine the second-best taxes in the presence of connected externalities. 
The individually-first-best policy scheme sets the tax on each externality equal to its marginal 
environmental damage. However, the first-best policy may not be feasible, as seems likely for 
nitrogen leaching. Given a suboptimal tax for one externality, the optimal tax for the other 
externality depends on the remaining distortions. We find that the second-best tax on carbon 
could be lower or higher than the first-best tax, depending on the nature of the distortion in the 
other externality and the interactions between the final goods. Only in the knife-edge case is the 
second-best tax rate equal to the first-best rate (marginal environmental damage).  
 
Because of ambiguity in the analytical results, we insert numerical parameter values to explore 
plausible empirical relationships between fossil fuels and biofuels, where greenhouse gases and 
nitrogen pollution are the externalities of concern.  Our numerical results confirm that a GHG tax 
increases nitrogen leaching, under the assumption that gasoline and ethanol are close substitutes.  
 
Our analytical solutions suggest that under certain circumstances, the optimal GHG tax could be 
higher than the marginal damage of GHG emissions. However, if the benchmark nitrogen tax is 
lower than its marginal environmental damage, and other parameters are set at plausible levels, 
then the optimal GHG tax is lower, and could be much lower, than the marginal environmental 
damage of GHG. 
  
In our model, the levels of the two externalities are not affected solely by their individual 
production processes. The market interaction between the final goods also plays an important 
role in determining the emission levels. Our numerical example illustrates the relative 
importance of the technical production parameters relative to the market interaction. If   
increases, the technical substitution parameter associated with fossil fuel production,  , has a 
significant impact on C but a small impact on N. On the other hand, the technical parameter 
associated with biofuel production,  , has a very small impact on both externalities, because   
governs the substitution between L and N in production of B based on their relative price changes, 
while the change in   has only a small impact on PL with no impact on   at all. Thus, with a 
change in  , the effect of the technical parameter of production B to the system is minimal. The 24 
 
elasticity of substitution between F and B in production of energy,  , is the most important 
parameter in determining the effect on N from an increase in  .  
 
Based on the sensitivity analyses, the parameter related to market interactions is the most 
important  in determining  the emission level of the other externality. Since the second-best 
policies are jointly determined by both emission levels, parameters affecting either or both 
emission levels matter to the policy design process. The second-best tax rate for one externality 
is most sensitive to the technical parameter in the production process associated with that 
externality and to the parameter that determines the substitution in utility between the two final 
goods.    25 
 
Appendix A: Solutions with Nitrogen Tax Change (  and  ) 
   
 
   










Appendix B: Determining the Signs for Parameters 
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Table 1. Major parameter definitions and baseline values 
Parameter  Definition  Baseline value 
  Expenditure share of L in X production, =     98% 
  Expenditure share of fuel in X production, =    2% 
  Expenditure share of gasoline in total fuel consumption, =   94% 
  Expenditure share of ethanol in total fuel consumption, =   6% 
  Expenditure share of X in gasoline production, =   93% 
  Expenditure share of emissions cost in gasoline production, =   7% 
  Expenditure share of L in ethanol production, =   89% 
  Expenditure share of emissions cost in ethanol production, =   11% 
  Share of L usage in X production in total endowment, =    99% 
  Share of L usage in B production in total endowment, =    1% 
  Expenditure share of X in consumer’s consumption =    98% 
  Expenditure share of E in consumer’s consumption =    2% 
  Income share of L in total income =    99.7% 
  Income share of C in total income =    0.2% 
  GHG tax rate ($/ton)  24.9 
  Nitrogen tax rate ($/lb)  1.73 
  Elasticity of substitution between inputs in X production   0.1 
  Elasticity of substitution between inputs in B production  1 
  Elasticity of substitution between inputs in F production  0.1 
  Elasticity of substitution between fossil fuel and biofuel  3.75 
  Elasticity of substitution between X and E for consumers  0.2 
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Table 2 Signs of Elasticity Coefficients for Different Variables Given Positive   
Variables           
  −  −  −  −  − 
  −  −  −  −  − 
  −  −  +  −  − 
  −  −  +  −  − 
  −  −  Ambiguous  −  − 
  + 
  − 
  + 
 
 “+” indicates that   has a positive effect on the variable from a positive change in the tax  . 
 “-” indicates that   has a negative effect on the variable from a positive change in the tax    




 Table 3 Coefficients for Elasticities in Selected Variable Solutions (from  ) 
Variables           
  -0.0249  -0.0366  -0.0044  -0.0012  0.0000 
  -0.0249  -0.0366  -0.0044  -0.9350  0.0000 
  -0.0249  -0.0366  0.0626  -0.0012  0.0000 
  -0.0249  -0.0366  0.0626  -0.0012  -0.0007 
  -0.0249  -0.0366  -0.0006  -0.0012  0.0000 
 34 
 
Table 4 Effects of GHG Tax Change (for  ) 
Variables   Percentage Change 
  -0.0264 
  -0.1198 
  0.2247 
  0.2240 
  -0.0101 
  -0.0005 
  0.0662 
  -0.0007 
  -0.0008 
 35 
 
Table 5a. Percentage Change for Each Variable, when  , for Different   
Variables  = 0  = 0.1  = 0.3  = 0.5 
  -0.0263  -0.0264  -0.0266  -0.0269 
  -0.0263  -0.1198  -0.3067  -0.4938 
  0.2248  0.2247  0.2245  0.2243 
  0.2241  0.2240  0.2237  0.2235 
  -0.0100  -0.0101  -0.0103  -0.0106 
  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0005 
 
Table 5b. Optimal GHG Tax for Different   
  = 0  = 0.1  = 0.3  = 0.5 
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Table 6a. Percentage Change of for Each Variable, when  , for Different   
Variables  = 0  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 1  = 2.5  = 3.75  = 5 
  -0.0099  -0.0104  -0.0108  -0.0143  -0.0209  -0.0264  -0.0319 
  -0.1033  -0.1037  -0.1042  -0.1077  -0.1143  -0.1198  -0.1253 
  -0.0099  -0.0037  0.0026  0.0526  0.1465  0.2247  0.3029 
  -0.0107  -0.0044    0.0018  0.0519  0.1458  0.2240  0.3022 
  -0.0099  -0.0099  -0.0099  -0.0099  -0.0100  -0.0101  -0.0102 
  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0004  -0.0005  -0.0007 
 
Table 6b. Optimal GHG Tax for Different   
  = 0  = 0.1  = 0.2  = 1  = 2.5  = 3.75  = 5 
               
 